In 1999, Korean Air Flight 8509 crashed shortly after takeoff from Gimpo Airport in Seoul, South Korea, en route to Milan. The crash was attributed to equipment failure and the captain's improper handling of the aircraft, yet the first officer failed to challenge the captain's decisions.
The accident investigation report pointed to cultural communication issues between the captain and the first officer as one of the causes of the crash, rooted in Confucian culture.
In Confucianism, hierarchical relationships are paramount, and it is unthinkable for those in lower positions to question their superiors. The captain and first officer of Korean Air Flight 8509, both South Koreans, had a clear hierarchical relationship, making it extremely difficult for the first officer to challenge the captain's decisions. The expectation was for subordinates to follow orders without question, which contributed to missing the opportunity to correct the mistake and ultimately led to the accident.
Pilots and co-pilots are both experts in their field, bearing significant responsibilities where mutual respect for opinions should be the norm. However, for a first officer to say, "I think this might be wrong" to a captain is not only a right in terms of safety but culturally, it's almost taboo.
Korean Air's corporate culture also played a role in the accident. The airline maintained a clear hierarchical relationship between captains and first officers, where captains were seen as "masters" and first officers as "helpers." Under this dynamic, it was undesirable for first officers to challenge captains, and for a first officer to take control was seen as undermining the captain's authority.
Furthermore, the captain was a former military personnel from the South Korean armed forces. Korean Air commonly employed ex-military officers as pilots, prioritizing their military rank over their experience with commercial or large aircraft. The captain of Flight 8509, despite having no experience with commercial or large aircraft, was hired as a captain for a large civilian cargo plane because of his high military rank, such as "Colonel."
First officers are obligated to monitor the captain's piloting and intervene or offer advice when the aircraft's bank or pitch exceeds normal limits. However, during the critical 45 seconds from gear retraction to crash, the first officer only mentioned altitude readings, radio communications with control, and suggested using alternative equipment information when a malfunction occurred. Despite functioning equipment on the first officer's side and advisories from the flight engineer, there was no mention of the abnormal bank angles, pitch, or speed until the end. With warning alarms sounding, the first officer failed to correct the captain's mistakes or seek corrections, leading to the crash.
The first officer, with relatively little experience (1,406 flight hours), was overwhelmed with various tasks after takeoff and may not have noticed the abnormal aircraft attitude. However, it's more likely that, despite being a trained and tested pilot, the first officer felt unable to intervene due to the severe reprimand received from the captain before takeoff.
While culture should be respected, when it comes to human lives, safety should take precedence over cultural norms.